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NASH EQUILIBRIA IN A MODEL OF MULTIPRODUCT 
PRICE COMPETITION: AN ASSIGNMENT PROBLEM 
 









We study the market interaction of a finite number of single-product firms 
and a representative buyer, where the buyer consumes bundles of these goods. 
The buyers' value function determines their willingness to pay for subsets of 
goods. We show that subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium outcomes are solutions 
of the linear relaxation of an integer programming assignment problem and that 
they always exits. The (subgame perfect) Nash-equilibrium price set is 
characterized by the Pareto frontier of the associated dual problem's projection on 
the firms' price vectors. We identify the Nash-equilibrium prices for monotonic 
buyers' value functions and, more importantly, we show that some central 
solution concepts in cooperative game theory are (subgame perfect) equilibrium 
prices of our strategic game.  
  
Keywords: Multiproduct price competition, Integer Programming, Subgame 
Perfect Nash Equilibria. 
 








 1I n t r o d u c t i o n .
We study the market interaction of a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms and a repre-
sentative buyer, where each ﬁrm produces at most one good and the buyer
consumes bundles of these goods. We show that subgame perfect Nash-
equilibrium outcomes are solutions of the linear relaxation of an integer pro-
gramming assignment problem, where subsets of goods are assigned to the
buyer.
Strategic interaction in markets has been thoroughly studied in the lit-
erature, and has mostly focused on the case of several ﬁrms which produce
a homogeneous good or goods which are close substitutes. The most well
known works are the Cournot quantity and the Bertrand price competition
models. However, the scenario where ﬁrms produce goods of a very general
nature has received little attention.
The literature on strategic multiproduct oligopolistic competition deals
with product diﬀerentiation, where each ﬁrm produces a single good with
diﬀerent characteristics, address models. Here we ﬁnd models of spatial com-
petition, where ﬁrms diﬀer in their location (see Hotelling 1929; d’Aspremont
et al. 1979; Salop 1979, among others) and models of quality diﬀerentiation
where a number of ﬁrms produce substitute goods that diﬀer in quality and
then sell to a continuum of buyers, identical in tastes but diﬀerent in income
(e.g. Gabszewicz and Thisse 1979, 1980, and Shaked and Sutton 1982, 1983).
In address models, ﬁrms try to relax competition through product diﬀerenti-
ation either by increasing distance from rival ﬁrms or by considering quality
gaps. On the other hand, the existence of pure strategy equilibrium in a
standard multiproduct Bertrand competition, has been shown by Milgrom
and Roberts (1990) and Milgrom and Shanon (1994), under some restric-
tions on the demand and cost functions, and when all goods are only either
substitutes or complements.
Ad i ﬀerent approach is that of Tauman et al. (1997, TUW, hereafter)
who study a simple model of price competition in a multiproduct oligopoly
market where goods can be of a very general nature and not necessarily
substitutes or complements. Each ﬁrm produces only one good and buyers
are all identical. The (representative) buyer purchases a bundle of goods and
either one or zero units of each of the products are chosen. Moreover, she
is characterized by her willingness to pay for every subset of goods. Firms
are engaged in price competition in the ﬁrst stage and buyers take their
2consumption decisions in the second stage. They show that a pure strategy
equilibrium always exists and that the equilibrium consumption is always
eﬃcient in the sense of maximizing total social surplus. The equilibrium
prices depend on the buyer’s value function, i.e. the buyer’s willingness to
pay as a function of the consumption bundle. However, the price function
can only be characterized either under concavity or convexity of the buyer’s
value function.
Our work generalizes the analysis of TUW(1997) and characterizes the
set of all subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium outcomes. Since the demand
function is unitary and buyers purchase bundles of goods, the equilibrium
analysis leads us towards combinatorial complexity which makes it necessary
to use integer linear programming to better handle the model’s indivisibilities.
Speciﬁcally, we oﬀer the set of equilibrium prices as some solutions of the
associated dual to the linear relaxation of an integer programming assignment
problem.
We show that the solutions of this linear programming problem are the
subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium prices and consumption set. It is interest-
ing to note that the solutions of a linear programming problem are a convex
polyhedron, and so is the projection of the dual problem’s solutions on ﬁrms’
price vectors. This polyhedron is completely determined by its vertices. The
Pareto frontier of the above projection has to be identiﬁed in order to charac-
terize the set of all (subgame perfect) Nash-equilibrium price vectors. As this
frontier can be expressed as the convex combination of non-Pareto dominated
vertices, we just need to obtain all these vertices. At every Nash equilibrium,
an o n - a c t i v eﬁrm may set prices equal to or diﬀerent from marginal costs,
and the selected ﬁrms’ prices are the non-Pareto dominated vectors of the
above Pareto frontier. The equilibrium consumption set is always eﬃcient.
Moreover, equilibrium prices belong to the core of the economy and, since in
this model the core is always decentralized by Walrasian prices, the Nash-
equilibrium prices are a subset of them. Thus, a ﬁrst important contribution
is to oﬀer a non-cooperative framework which provides foundations for coop-
erative solutions as the result of strategic behavior.
Furthermore, when the buyers’ value function is convex, symmetric k-
convex or 1-convex, some speciﬁcs o l u t i o nc o n c e p t si nc o o p e r a t i v eg a m et h e -
ory, such as the Shapley value and the nucleolus of the buyer’s value function
are subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium prices of our non-cooperative game.
In general, when the buyer’s value function is k-convex, her surplus is always
3zero and then the core of this value function is always priced as subgame per-
fect Nash-equilibrium prices. These results are related with the literature on
the design of simple non-cooperative mechanisms implementing cooperative
s o l u t i o n sc o n c e p t sa si nP ´ erez-Castrillo (1994), P´ erez-Castrillo and Wettstein
(2001) and P´ erez-Castillo and Sotomayor (2002), among others.
W h e nt h eb u y e r ’ sv a l u ef u n c t i o nf o rbundles of goods is monotonic and
products are substitutes, then equilibrium prices are products’ marginal con-
tributions and the buyer’s surplus is always positive, which reﬂects the un-
derlying market competition. Moreover, under this setting the equilibrium
price vector is unique and coincides with the maximal Walrasian price of the
economy. In other words, the most preferred point by ﬁrms (or the least
preferred by the buyer) in the core of the economy is priced as the subgame
perfect Nash-equilibrium price vector. Now it is easy to show that when
the buyer’s value function is concave, then products are substitutes and the
above result applies.
The market model considered here is also related to the matching lit-
erature (e.g. Kelso and Crawford 1982, KC) and with assignment games.
In particular, some extensions of the canonical standard assignment model,
with many sellers and buyers interacting, have recently received increasing
attention. These models are two-sided matching markets, where sellers have
an initial endowment of indivisible objects and buyers have a utility func-
tion over any package or bundle of objects. Diﬀerences in the framework are
based on the units produced (each seller has only one product and only one
unit of this product or sellers have no restriction on their production); the
units purchased (just one or a bundle); the number of sellers (one or sev-
eral); the number of buyers; the price of a bundle (additive or non-additive
pricing functions), etc. The package assignment problem has been studied
by Gul and Stacchetti (2000, GS), Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997, BM)
and Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2001, BO), among others. In all these papers
utility functions are quasilinear in money, deﬁned on bundles of goods and
buyers play the same role: they select, given ﬁrms’ prices, the best bundle.
The main diﬀerence between these models and our paper is that we deal
with strategic equilibrium where ﬁrms are price setters, while they deal with
Walrasian equilibria. Another diﬀerence is that we deal with homogeneous
buyers, but no restriction on the set of goods is assumed, while, for instance,
GS deal with heterogeneous buyers, but with goods which have no comple-
mentarities (a notion closely related to gross substitutability). BM and BO
4give a linear programming characterization of the Walrasian equilibrium out-
comes while we provide it for subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium outcomes,
although their model is more general than ours.
To sum up, we formulate the subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium outcomes
of a multiproduct market with a representative buyer, as a modiﬁed exten-
sion of the standard assignment model and prove the equivalence of linear
programming solutions and subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium outcomes. Al-
though the results of this paper are dri v e nb yt h ef a c tt h a tt h e r ei so n l yo n e
type of buyer, they open the door for the application of duality methods in
more general strategic models.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2.
The assingment problem and its linear relaxation are oﬀered in Section 3.
Section 4 is devoted to prove the existence and characterization of subgame
perfect Nash-equilibrium outcomes. Speciﬁc results for monotonic, concave
and k-convex value functions are given in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 deals
with the extension to positive marginal costs.
2 The model
The model consists of a buyer (or a set of identical buyers) and n ﬁrms as
in TUW (1997). Each ﬁrm produces one unit of a single product. Moreover,
diﬀerent ﬁrms may produce diﬀerent goods. Let N = {1,2,...,n} be the
set of ﬁrms. We use the same notation for ﬁrms and products. The buyer
consumes either one or zero units of each one of the n products and is denoted
as player 0.
A consumption set of the buyer is a subset S of N. The buyer has a value
function v(S)o v e ra n ys u b s e tS ⊆ N, which represents her total willingness
to pay for the consumption set S,w i t h 1 v(∅)=0 . L e tci be the (constant)
unit cost of production of ﬁrm i and c =( c1,c 2,...,cn) the cost vector.
The sequence of events unfolds as follows. First, each ﬁrm i chooses its
price pi ∈ R+ independently and simultaneously to the others. Then, the
buyer observes the price vector p =( p1,...,pn) ∈ Rn
+ and selects a consump-
tion set S ⊆ N as a function of p. As a result of the trade each ﬁrm i in S
1The function v can be derived from a consumer’s utility function which is quasilinear
in money. Then, v :2 N −→ R,w h e r e2 N is the power set of N.
5earns a net payoﬀ of pi − ci and zero otherwise. The buyer obtains a payoﬀ
equal to her surplus.
Formally, we have a strategic game with n +1p l a y e r s ,0 ,1,2,..,n.T h e
set of strategies of each ﬁrm is R+ and that of the buyer is S0,t h es e to f
functions S from Rn
+ to 2N. Finally, the payoﬀ function (the proﬁt) for each
i ∈ N is given by
πi(S,p)=
 
pi − ci i ∈ S(p)
0 i/ ∈ S(p)
where S(p) is the consumption set of the buyer corresponding to p ∈ Rn
+.
The payoﬀ function of the buyer is given by her surplus cs(S,p)=v(S(p))−  
k∈S(p) pk.
Denote this economy by G(n +1 ,v,c)a n dl e tSPE∗ be the set of all its
pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria. Let (S,p)b ei nSPE∗.T h e np is
called an SPE∗-price vector, S = S(p)a nSPE∗-consumption set and (S,p)
an SPE∗-outcome.
It is not diﬃcult to show that (N,p)i sa nSPE∗-outcome iﬀ p ≥ c and
(CB) Buyer optimality: v(N)−
 
k∈N pk ≥ v(T)−
 
k∈T pk for all T ⊆ N;








This is so because (CB) is implied by subgame perfection and (CF1) by
ﬁrms’ incentives. Suppose that (CF1) does not hold, then by (CB) for some








and then ﬁrm i is better oﬀ charging a price pi + ε,f o ras u ﬃciently small
ε > 0, such that (CB) is still satisﬁed for all Si ⊆ N\{i}.T h i si m p l i e st h a t
the buyer, when observing the price vector ( p−i,p i+ε), will again choose the
consumption set N. Conversely, if (CB) and (CF1) are satisﬁed then (N,p)
is an SPE∗-outcome since N is a best choice for the buyer and no ﬁrm has
an incentive to either reduce or increase its price. Notice that set Si in (CF1)
may be empty and in this case v(N) −
 
k∈N pk =0 ,a n dﬁrms extract the
entire buyer surplus.
6Suppose now that (S,p)i sa nSPE∗-outcome with S  = N.T h e n , t h e
equilibrium conditions must guarantee that no ﬁrm i outside S beneﬁts from
a price reduction and thus S has to remain a best choice for the buyer even
if a ﬁrm i/ ∈ S reduces its price to its marginal cost level. Then, (S,p)i sa n
SPE∗-outcome iﬀ pk ≥ ck for every k ∈ S, (CB) and (CF1) are satisﬁed in
S,a n d








As in TUW(1997), we only consider the set of pure strategy subgame
perfect equilibria of the above economy which remains as equilibrium out-
comes even if all non-selling ﬁrms set marginal cost prices. This restriction
removes the set of equilibrium outcomes in which ﬁrms charge unreasonably
high prices so that no individual ﬁrm can beneﬁt from a price reduction of
its product (see example 1 below). To deﬁne this restriction of the set of
Nash equilibria consider p =( p1,...,p n) ∈ Rn
+ and let S ⊆ N.D e n o t eb ypS





pi i ∈ S
ci i/ ∈ S
Deﬁnition 1 For every triplet (N,v,c) deﬁne
SPE = {(S,p) ∈ SPE
∗|p ≥ c and (S,p
S) ∈ SPE
∗}
Assume for simplicity that each ci =0 ,i∈ N (we will consider the non-
zero cost case in the last section). The next Proposition characterizes the set
of SPE-outcomes (for c =( 0 ,0,...,0)), where (C1) and (C2) are as (CB) and
(CF1) respectively, and (C3) refers now to sets of non-selected ﬁrms instead
of (CF2) (its proof runs similar to that of (CB), (CF1) and (CF2)).
Throughout the paper we denote by |S| the number of products (ﬁrms)
in the consumption set S ⊆ N.
Proposition 1 (TUW,1997) (1) Suppose that S  = N. Then (S,p) is an
SPE-outcome iﬀ p ≥ 0 and
(C1) v(S) −
 
k∈S pk ≥ v(T) −
 
k∈T pk for all T ⊆ N;
















(2) If S = N then (S,p) is an SPE-outcome iﬀ p ≥ 0 and C1-C2 are
veriﬁed.
Finally, given K ⊆ N,d e ﬁne,
V (K)=m a x
S⊆K
{v(S)}
as the maximum social surplus in economy G(k +1 ,v)=G(k +1 ,v,c =
(0,0,...,0)), where k = |K|, i.e., the maximum of the buyer’s value function
when considering consumption sets in K.
Since we are interested in the ”eﬃciency” of SPE-outcomes, we will com-
pare them with the core:
Deﬁnition 2 (T-core) Let T ⊆ N.T h eT-core of the economy G(n+1,v),
denoted by T-core(G),a r ea l lt h ep a i r s(pb,p) ∈ R
n+1
+ ,s u c ht h a t
(i) pb +
 
k∈T pk = v(T),
(ii) pb +
 
k∈S∩T pk ≥ v(S), ∀S ⊆ N.
The element pb is the buyer surplus and each pk the payoﬀ to ﬁrm k.I f
T = N, then we obtain the core of the economy, denoted core(G). Also, the
subset of points in the T-core(G) such that the buyer surplus, pb,i sz e r o ,









pk ≥ v(S), ∀S ⊆ N}
The intuition of the T-core(v) concept is as follows. Suppose that the
equilibrium consumption set is T.T h e n ,ﬁrms in N\T obtain zero and hence
8will be willing to join the set of seller ﬁrms. Hence, every subset S ⊆ T can
actually achieve uT(S)w h e r e ,
uT(S)= m a x
A⊆N\T
{v(S ∪ A)}
It can be veriﬁed that the projection of the T-core(v)o nT coincides with
the N-core(uT) when the buyer surplus is zero.
2.1 Some motivating examples
Example 1: The market of two right-hand gloves and one left-hand glove.




13 ∈ S, |S| ≥ 2
0 otherwise
SPE-outcome set: There are three SPE-consumption sets, N, {1,3} and
{2,3}. The prices supporting each of them are, p =( 0 ,0,1) for the ﬁrst
consumption set; p =( 0 ,α,1) with α ≥ 0 for the second one and p =( α,0,1)
for the third set. Hence, the SPE-outcome set is:
{({1,2,3},(0,0,1))} ∪ {({1,3},(0,α,1))|α ≥ 0} ∪ {({2,3},(α,0,1))|α ≥ 0}
Note that the buyer surplus is zero at each equilibrium outcome, since
ﬁrm 3 exploits the buyer’s entire willingness to pay. Moreover, non-selected
ﬁrms may ﬁxap o s i t i v ep r i c e .E v e r ySPE-consumption bundle, S,i se ﬃcient
in the sense that S ∈ argmaxS⊆N{v(S)}.
Observe that our characterization of the Nash-equilibrium rules out out-
comes of the SPE∗ set. For instance, {∅,(β,β,β)},w i t hβ > 1, belongs to
the SNE∗-outcome set, since it satisﬁes (CB), (CF1) and (CF2). However,
this equilibrium is unreasonable since no product is sold and no individual
ﬁrm can sell its product by a price reduction.
The core: The set of vectors in N-core(G)=Core(G)i s
Core(G)={1 − α,(0,0,α)|0 ≤ α ≤ 1}.
Thus, the buyer surplus is pb =1− α, which is zero iﬀ α =1 ,h e n c et h e
N-core(v)i sp o i n t( 0 ,0,1).






0 |S| ≤ 1
1.5 S = {1,2}
1 otherwise
SPE set: There exists a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium out-
come of this game, (S,p)=( {1,2},(0.5,0.5,0)). The buyer surplus is positive
and equal to v({1,2}) − p1 − p2 =0 .5. Firm 3 does not sell its product and
then the price of product 3 is equal to zero. The SPE-consumption set is
eﬃcient.
The core: Given that T = {1,2}, the set of price vectors in T-core(G)i s
{(α,β,0)|0 ≤ α ≤ 0.5,0 ≤ β ≤ 0.5}. N o t et h a ts i n c et h eb u y e rs u r p l u si s
pb =1 .5 − α − β ≥ 0.5, the T-core(v)= ∅.
Example 3: This example is a variation of the one above. Let N =





0 |S| ≤ 1o rS = {3,4}
1.5 S = {1,2}
1 otherwise
The SPE-outcome set is {({1,2},(0.5,0.5,0,α))|α ≥ 0}∪{({1,2},(0.5,0.5,α,0))|α ≥
0}. This example shows that when there is more than one ﬁrm out of the
SPE-consumption set, at least one of them charges a zero price.
The core: As in example 2, since T = {1,2}, the set of vectors in T-
core(G)i s{(1.5 − α − β),(α,β,0,0)|0 ≤ α ≤ 0.5,0 ≤ β ≤ 0.5} and the
T-core(v)= ∅.
Example 4: In the above examples the buyer surplus is the same in all
SPE-outcomes. However, this is not true in general as shown below. Let
N = {1,2,3},c=( 0 ,0,0) and let the value function be,
S 1231 ,21 ,32 ,31 ,2,3
v 6 5 5 000 1 0
SPE set: The SPE-outcomes are,
SPE = {(N,(5 − α,4 − α,α))|2 ≤ α ≤ 4} ∪
{(N,(5 − α,α,α))|0 ≤ α ≤ 2} ∪
{(N,(3 − α,2+α,2 − α))|0 ≤ α ≤ 2}
10thus,
 
k∈N pk is not a constant. It depends on α and varies between 5 and
7. The buyer surplus varies from 3, in (N,(3,2,2)) to 5, in (N,(5,0,0)).
The Core: Notice that the T-core=Core(G) and the set of core vectors is
Core(G)={(10−α−β−γ),(α,β,γ)|0 ≤ α+β ≤ 5,0 ≤ α+γ ≤ 5,0 ≤ β+γ ≤ 4}.
and since, pb =1 0− α − β − γ ≥ 1, then the N-core(v)= ∅.
3 The Linear Programming problem
O u rm a i nr e s u l ts h o w st h a tt h eSPE-outcome set of G(n+1,v)i se q u i v a l e n t
to integer-valued solutions of a corresponding linear programming ”many-to-
one” assignment problem, LP hereafter, where subsets of goods are assigned
to the buyer.
Since our purpose is to ﬁnd a ”suitable” assignment of a set of sellers
(products) to the representative buyer, deﬁne variable y(S), for each set
S ⊆ N, which is equal to 1 if the buyer chooses the consumption set S and
0 otherwise. The integer linear programming under consideration, denoted











y(S) ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ N
y(S) ∈ {0,1}
The ﬁrst constraint ensures that only one consumption set is selected. The
next constraints are redundant given the ﬁrst one, but they deﬁne the price
vector in the associated dual problem. L e tu sc o n s i d e rt h el i n e a rr e l a x a t i o n
LP of ILP in which we change the integrity constraints y(S) ∈ {0,1} of
ILP by y(S) ≥ 0f o ra l lS ⊆ N.
Let DLP be the dual of LP. Since the right-hand sides of all the con-






where πb -the variable associated to the ﬁrst constraint- stand for the buyer’s
surplus and πi -the variables associated to the other n constraints- stand for





πi ≥ v(S) ∀S ⊆ N
π
b,πi ≥ 0
The set of solutions of ILP is the set of optimal feasible solutions (vertex
points) of LP because of its special structure. Notice that if we remove the
redundant constraints of LP we are left with the constraint whose coeﬃcients
are equal to 1 and the non-negativity conditions on variables S,f o ra l lS ⊆
N. It is well known that the solutions for such a problem are integer: the
variable corresponding to the maximum coeﬃcient in the objective function
is set to 1 and the remaining variables are set to 0. Hence, in our case, an
integer solution always exists and it is the consumption set   S ⊆ N such that
  S ∈ argmaxS⊆N v(S).
Moreover, by the fundamental duality theorem (see Dantzig, 1974, p.125),
if the primal problem has an optimal feasible solution, so does its dual prob-
lem and the two optimal value functions are the same. Also notice that the
set of solutions is a convex polyhedron. Denote this set by sol(.).
Interpreting variables πi of the dual problem as ﬁrms prices, let us deﬁne
Π = {{πi}i∈N ∈ R
n|∃π
b such that (π




i}i∈N) ∈ sol(DLP), such that π
 
i ≥ πi,f o ra l li and ∃j with π
 
j > πj}
as the Pareto frontier of the projection of set sol(DLP)o nc o o r d i n a t e s
{πi}i∈N. We will see below that Π will provide the Nash equilibrium prices
for our economy. Furthermore, the projection of a convex polyhedron is a
convex polyhedron as well and then the set Π is its Pareto frontier and can
be expressed as the convex combination of adjacent vertices. A way to obtain
some of these vertices is to consider, among all solutions of the dual problem,
12those maximizing
 















πi = V (N)
π
b,πi ≥ 0
Obviously, sol(RDLP) ⊆ sol(DLP).
To generate all the frontier Π we deﬁne a family of problems which take
into account the lexicographic order of the solutions of DLP. To this end, let
µ be an ordered partition of N in the sense that the order of the elements in
the partition is relevant. Thus, µ and µ  can give rise to the same partition,
but with a diﬀerent order in their elements. Let Γ denote the set of all the
ordered partitions. Write µ = {N1,N 2,...,NL} ∈ Γ to mean that under µ
the ﬁrst element of the partition is N1, the second in N2 and the last one in
NL.N o t et h a tL can diﬀer from one partition to another.





















πi = V (N)
π
b,πi ≥ 0( * )
where d is an integer2 such that n · v(S) < 10d for all S ⊆ N. Note that the








2The general condition is d to be a suﬃciently high integer.
13The partition formulation does not change the constraints but makes the
objective function vary. The objective function is an integer for which each
set of d (consecutive) digits are determined by
 
i∈Nl πi.T h u s , t h e ﬁrst
d digits are occupied by
 
i∈N1 πi, the second d digits by
 
i∈N2 πi and so
on, and, ﬁnally, the last d digits by
 
i∈NL πi.I n t h i s w a y , sol(µ-DLP) ⊆
sol(DLP) so that, a solution in µ-DLP gives one of the most preferred price
vectors by ﬁrms in N1; it gives one of the most preferred price vectors by the
set of ﬁrms in N2, among those most preferred by ﬁrms in N1;a n ds oo n .
Example 4 (continuation): Let us solve µ-DLP for diﬀerent partitions
µ ∈ Γ. First notice that n · v(S)=3· 10 < 102,t h u sw eﬁx the parameter
d =2 .
Let µ = {{1},{2},{3}}. The solution of µ-DLP is the one which solves,
MaxF(µ,π)=Max{π1 · 10
4 + π2 · 10
2 + π3 · 10
0}
subjet to the above constraints (*)
and gives the highest possible payoﬀ (π1 =5 )t oﬁrm 1. Then, among all the
solutions of DLP with π1 = 5, the one which gives ﬁrm 2 the biggest payoﬀ
(π2 = 0) is selected and ﬁnally ﬁrm 3 receives π3 =0 .
However, if µ  = {{3},{2},{1}} then the solution of the corresponding
µ -DLP gives ﬁrm 3 the biggest possible payoﬀ , π3 = 4; then, among all
the solutions of DLP with π3 = 4, the one which gives ﬁrm 2 the biggest
one, π2 = 0 is selected and ﬁnally the payoﬀ to ﬁrm 1 is π1 =1 . Thus, the
solution of µ -DLP is π1 =1 , π2 =0 , π3 =4 .
Finally, when µ   = {N},t h e nsol(µ  -DLP)=sol(RDLP), and π1 =
3,π2 = π3 = 2 is the solution which maximizes the objective function
F(N,π)=Max{π1 + π2 + π3}.
As we can see all these solutions belong to the SPE-price vector set of
example 4.
The next Lemma shows that the dual solutions {πi}i∈N achieved by dif-
ferent partitions are in the Pareto frontier Π.
Lemma 1 Let µ,µ  ∈ Γ,l e t(πb,π) ∈ sol(µ-DLP) and let (π b,π ) ∈ sol(µ -
DLP). Then both π and π belong to Π.
14Proof: Suppose that πi ≤ π 
i for all i ∈ N and πk < π 
k, for some k ∈ N.
























which implies that (πb,π) is not a solution of µ-DLP, a contradiction. 
Deﬁne the binary relation to be coarser than in set Γ as follows. Given
µ,µ  ∈ Γ,w es a yt h a tµ  = {N 
1,...,N 
L} is coarser than µ = {N1,..., NM} if
N
 
1 = N1 ∪ N2 ∪ ... ∪ Nn1
N
 





L = NnL−1 ∪ ... ∪ NM
C l e a r l yt h i sb i n a r yr e l a t i o ni sr e ﬂexive, anti-symmetric and transitive so
that it induces a partial order relation, with all the maximal chains ending
in N and starting in any of the total partitions of N.
Coarser partitions have more degrees of freedom and hence the sum of
dual solutions {πi}i∈N is bigger. This is proven in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 Let µ,µ  ∈ Γ,w i t hµ coarser than µ . Then πb ≤ π b, for all
(πb,π) ∈ sol(µ-DLP) and (π b,π ) ∈ sol(µ -DLP).
Proof: It suﬃces to prove it for two consecutive partitions of a maximal







i for k =1 ,...,l− 1. Moreover,
 
















i which implies that πb ≤ π b. 
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4.1 Existence
Propositions 2 and 3 establish that the Cartesian product of solutions of
LP and the associated µ-DLP are SPE-outcomes. First, we start with a
general property which states that the prices of non-active ﬁrms are set equal
to marginal costs at any solution of LP and DLP problems.
Lemma 3 Let the pair {S, (  πb,  π)} be a solution of LP and DLP respec-
tively. Then for all j ∈ N\  S,   πj =0 .
Proof: If j ∈ N\  S, then the constraint
 
S j y(S) ≤ 1o fLP is strict.
Hence, by the complementary slackness condition, the dual variable associ-
ated to this constraint,   πj must be zero. Obviously, this property holds for
any solution of µ-DLP. 
The next Proposition gives an existence result similar to that of TUW(1997).
It shows that any element of  sol(LP) × sol(µ-DLP)  is a subgame perfect
Nash-equilibrium outcome, i.e., sol(LP) give the equilibrium consumption
set and sol(µ-DLP) an equilibrium price vector, for some partition µ.N o -
tice that, according to the above lemma, the non-active ﬁrms, set prices equal
to zero. Its proof appears in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 Let v be a value function, let   S ∈ sol(LP) and let (  πb,  π) be
as o l u t i o no fµ-DLP,f o rs o m ep a r t i t i o nµ. Then (  S,  π) is an SPE-outcome.
We may apply this Proposition to examples 2 and 4 above.
example 2 (continuation): The unique primal solution is S = {1,2}.
Moreover, the unique solution of the restricted dual problem (i.e. µ = N)i s
sol(RDLP)={(0.5,(0.5,0.5,0))}. Thus, by Proposition 2 ({1,2},(0.5,0.5,0)) ∈
SPE-outcome set and the buyer gets a surplus of πb = v({1,2})−p1 −p2 =
0.5.
example 4 (continuation): In section 3 we oﬀered the solutions of several
µ-DLP’s associated to some partitions. Here, we oﬀer a full list of them:





Thus, (N,(5,0,0)), (N,(3,2,2)),(N,(1,4,0)) and (N,(1,0,4)) are SPE-
outcomes. Notice that the buyer surplus in the second of them,   πb = v(N)−
p1 − p2 − p3 =3 , is lower than the one corresponding to the other SPE-
outcomes, where   πb =5i na l lo ft h e m .
By the above Proposition, the solutions of µ-DLP are the SPE-price
vectors in which the non-active ﬁrms set prices equal to zero. However, as
examples 1 and 3 show, there are SPE-price vectors in which these ﬁrms
may set positive prices: in example 1, ({1,3},(0,1,1)) is an SPE-outcome
and the non-producing ﬁrm 2 sets a price equal to 1. This is in clear contrast
with example 2, where the unique SPE-outcome, ({1,2},(0.5,0.5,0)), is such
that the non-producing ﬁrm cannot set a positive price, given that, say ﬁrm
1 would increase the price of its product.
The next Proposition shows that when producing ﬁrms extract the entire
buyer surplus, i.e., πb = 0, then the non-producing ones can price arbitrar-
ily , thus extending the previous existence proof. Notice that in this case
sol(RDLP)= sol(DLP). Given S ⊆ N and p ∈ Rn
+, write p =( pS,p N\S),
then we can state the following:
Proposition 3 Let v be a value function, let   S ∈ sol(LP) and (0,  π) ∈




We show next the eﬃciency of any equilibrium consumption set. Given
S ⊆ N and p ∈ Rn
+, recall that pS =( pS,0) means that the non-active ﬁrms
set prices equal to zero.
Lemma 4   S is an SPE-consumption set if and only if   S ∈ argmaxS⊆N v(S).
Proof: Let   S ∈ argmaxS⊆N v(S), then   S ∈ sol(LP). We also know that
sol(µ-DLP)  = ∅,t h u sl e t(   πb,  π) ∈ sol(µ-DLP). By Proposition 2, these
solutions give an SPE-outcome, where   S is the SPE-consumption set.
17Now, let us check that if (  S,  p)i sa nSPE-outcome, then   S ∈ argmaxS⊆N v(S).
If (  S,  p) ∈ SPE-outcome set, then (  S,p
  S)i sa l s oa nSPE by C3 of Propo-
sition 1. Then by C1, for all T ⊆ N, v(  S) −
 
k∈  S p
  S





Thus, v(  S) − v(T) ≥
 
k∈  S\T pk ≥ 0a n dt h e nv(S) ≥ v(T).
When πb = 0, then the proof runs similarly by applying Proposition 3
and the above reasoning. 
Corollary 1 If (S,p) ∈ SPE-outcome set, then S maximizes the social sur-
plus.
Proof: If (S,p) ∈ SPE,t h e nS maximizes the sum of the buyer surplus













4.2 Characterization of the SPE-price set by Linear
Programming duality
In this subsection we oﬀer the central result of the paper: the characterization
of the SPE-price vectors of the economy G(n+1,v). When the buyer surplus
is positive and the non-active ﬁrms set their prices equal to marginal costs,
the set of SPE-price vectors is set Π, i.e., the non-Pareto dominated convex
hull of solutions of µ-DLP for all µ ∈ Γ.W h e n πb = 0, this convex hull
characterizes the prices of the producing ﬁrms and the other ﬁrms’ prices are
arbitrary.
Let (S,p)a n d( S,pS)b et w oSPE-outcomes, where pS =( pS,0). Then
clearly, ﬁrms and the buyer obtain the same payoﬀs under such outcomes:
the two equilibria are payoﬀ-equivalent. Thus, any pair (S,pS)a l l o w su st o
identify its payoﬀ equivalence class. For any set of payoﬀ equivalent SPE-
outcomes, we are only considering (S,pS) as the representative outcome of
this equivalence class.
Before proving the main result we oﬀer some properties of the SPE-
outcome set. The ﬁrst one says that any product not belonging to all the
18SPE-consumption bundles is priced at zero. The intuition behind is that
if a product does not belong to all the optimal consumption sets it can be
easily substituted for any other product and then it is priced at marginal
cost. Furthermore, given an SPE-price vector p supporting an equilibrium
consumption bundle   S and given any other optimal consumption S, the trans-
formation of p,d e n o t e db ypS, where prices of products outside S are equal
to zero, is also an SPE-price vector supporting S.
These two facts summarize the remarkable property that given an SPE-
price vector p,t h e na n yo p t i m a lc onsumption bundle S is always supported
by pS. In other words, there is not a bijective mapping between equilibrium
price vectors and equilibrium consumption bundles and this is why any ele-
ment of the Cartesian product  sol(LP)×sol(µ-DLP)  is a Nash-equilibrium
outcome as shown in Proposition 2 above.
Lemma 5 (i) Let D = {k ∈ N|k ∈ S for all S ∈ argmaxK⊆N v(K)}.I f
i/ ∈ D,t h e npi =0 ,f o ra l lp ∈ SPE-price set.
(ii) If (  S,p) is an SPE-outcome and S ∈ argmaxK⊆N v(K) then (S,pS) ∈
SPE-outcome set, where pS =( pS,0) is deﬁned from p.
Proof: (i) We show that if (S,p) ∈ SPE-outcome set, then pi =0f o r
all i ∈ S\D.I f S\D = ∅ then the result trivially holds. Let i ∈ S\D ,
then there exists Si ∈ argmaxK⊆N v(K) such that i/ ∈ Si.I f( S,p) ∈ SPE-
outcome set, then (S,pS) ∈ SPE-outcome set and S ∈ argmaxK⊆N v(K)
(Lemma 4). By C1, v(S) −
 
k∈S pS
k ≥ v(Si) −
 
k∈Si pS










k.T h u spS
k =0f o ra l lk ∈ S\Si (and i
∈ S\Si).
Moreover, if (S,p) ∈ SPE-outcome set, then pS = pD,( S,pD) ∈ SPE-
outcome set and the buyer surplus is the same, i.e., v(S)−
 
k∈S pk = v(S)−  
k∈S pD
k .
(ii) It suﬃces to prove that (S,p
  S) ∈ SPE-outcome set, given that pS =
p
  S = pD, i.e., that v(  S) −
 
k∈  S p
  S


































where the equality holds since by Lemma 4,   S ∈ argmaxK⊆N v(K)a n dt h e
inequality holds since p
  S





k = v(  S) −
 
k∈  S p
  S
k and (S,p
  S) ∈ SPE-outcome
set. 
The next result states that Pareto-dominated prices can never be SPE-
prices.
Lemma 6 Let p ∈ Rn
+, if there exists (  S,  p) ∈ SPE-outcome set such that
  p
  S ≥ p
  S and   pj >p j for some j ∈   S,t h e np is not an SPE-price vector.
Proof: If p is an SPE-price vector then p
  S is also an SPE-price vector,
thus we only have to prove that p
  S is not an SPE-price vector.
(  S,  p) ∈ SPE-outcome set, hence (  S,  p
  S) ∈ SPE-outcome set. Let Sj ⊆
N\{j},b yC 1



































































































20for all Sj ⊆ N\{j} and hence C2 never holds for p
  S. 
Notice ﬁr s tt h a ta n ySPE-price vector where non-active ﬁrms set prices
equal to marginal costs is a solution of DLP, since it can be easily checked
that SPE-price vectors satisfying (C1)-(C3) verify all the constraints of the
linear programming problem. Then, since by Lemma 6, if   p ∈ SPE-price
vector, then there does not exist any other (πb,π
  S) ∈ sol(DLP) such that π
  S
weakly Pareto-dominates   π
  S,t h es o l u t i o n so fµ-DLP are equilibrium prices
(see Lemma 1).
Proposition 4 Let v be a value function. (  S,  p
  S) ∈ SPE-outcome set if and
only if
i)   S ∈ sol(LP),
ii) (  πb,  π
  S) ∈ Π, i.e., it is a convex combination of solutions of µ-DLP
problems, where   πb = v(  S) −
 
k∈  S   p
  S
k,a n d  π
  S =   p
  S.
Proof: See Appendix.
Corollary 2 Let v be a value function, let   S ∈ sol(LP) and let (  πb,  π) be a
solution of RDLP. Then (  S,  π) is the SPE-outcome which gives the lowest
surplus to the buyer.
Proof: By Lemma 2, where µ = {N} is the coarsest partition, (  S,  π)i s
the SPE-outcome which gives the lowest surplus to the buyer. 
The next results relates SPE- o u t c o m e sw i t hb o t hc o r e ( G)a n dWE-
outcomes. To this end let WEbe the set of Walrasian equilibrium outcomes.
Recall that (S,p)i saWE-outcome iﬀ p ≥ 0( o rm a r g i n a lc o s t s ) ,a n d
(i) v(S) −
 
k∈S pk ≥ v(T) −
 
k∈T pk for all T ⊆ N
(ii) If i/ ∈ S then pi =0 .
The next proposition shows that core(G) coincides with the solutions of
the dual linear problem and that it is completely priced by the set of WE-
prices.
Proposition 5 Let v be a value function which deﬁnes the economy G(n +
1,v,c=0 )and let T ∈ argmaxS⊆N{v(S)}. Then,
i) sol(DLP)=T-core(G)
ii) (pb,p) ∈ T-core(G) if and only if (T,p) ∈ WEand pb = v(T)−
 
k∈T pk
21Proof: First, let us prove that sol(DLP)= c o r e ( G). If (pb,p) ∈ sol(DLP),




















Hence (pb,p) ∈ T-core(G).
On the other hand, let (pb,p) ∈ T-core(G), then pk =0f o ra l lk/ ∈ T and










for all S ⊆ N, and the constraints of DLP are satisﬁed. Moreover, by
condition i) of the deﬁnition of the core pb +
 
T pi = pb +
 
N pi = v(T),
thus (pb,p) ∈ sol(DLP).
Now, let us prove ii). By the ﬁrst welfare theorem if (T,p) ∈ WE-outcome
set, and pb = v(T) −
 
k∈T pk, then (pb,p) ∈ T-core(G), thus we only have
to show that if (pb,p) ∈ T-core(G). Then (T,p) ∈ WE-outcome set. Let
(pb,p) ∈ T-core(G)t h e npk =0f o ra l lk/ ∈ T and condition (ii) of the
WE characterization holds. Besides, pb = v(T)−
 
k∈T pk and given S ⊆ N,
pb+
 




k∈S pk ≥ v(S), which implies
condition (i) of the WE characterization. 
By the above proposition we have,
Corollary 3 The set of SPE-prices, where the non-active ﬁrms set prices
equal to zero, jointly with the associated buyer surplus is a subset of core(G).
Then, these SPE-prices are a subset of the WE-prices.
Furthermore,
Lemma 7 Let (S,p) ∈ WE-outcome set such that there exists no (S ,p  ) ∈
WE with p 
i ≥ pi for all i ∈ N and p 
k >p k for some k ∈ N.T h e n
(S,p) ∈ SPE-outcome set.
22Proof: Let (S,p)beaWE-outcome which satisﬁes the above assumptions.
We prove that (S,p)v e r i ﬁes C1 to C3. By condition (i) of the deﬁnition of
WE,C 1i ss a t i s ﬁed. C3 holds given that pi =0f o ri/ ∈ S. Finally, suppose









Let p  be a price vector such that p 
i = pi for all i ∈ N\{j} and p 
j = pj+ ,
where   < maxS ⊆N\{j}{v(S) −
 
k∈S pk − v(S ) −
 
k∈S  pk}.T h e nw eh a v e













i =0f o ra l li/ ∈ S.T h u s , ( S,p ) ∈ WE-outcome set and p  Pareto
dominates p which contradicts the assumption. Then C2 is also satisﬁed. 
5 Some particular value functions
In this section we characterize the SPE-outcomes for concave and k-convex
monotonic value functions and identify some explicit SPE-price vectors. We
will show that when v is convex, symmetric k-convex or 1-convex, some
central solution concepts in cooperative game theory, such as the Shapley
v a l u ea n dt h en u c l e o l u sa r e( s u b g a m ep e r f e c t )SPE-prices of our proposed
non-cooperative game. When v is concave, the SPE-prices are the marginal
values of the products. Moreover, in this case the SPE-price set is a singleton
and, in turn, coincides with the maximal Walrasian price. We begin with
some deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 3 v is monotonic if and only if v(S) ≤ v(T) whenever S ⊆ T ⊆
N.
Monotonicity of v implies that the buyer’s willingness to pay increases
f o rl a r g e rc o n s u m p t i o ns e t s .
23Deﬁnition 4 (1) v is convex if and only if
v(S + i) − v(S) ≤ v(T + i) − v(T)
whenever S ⊆ T ⊆ N\i,a n d
(2) v is concave if and only if
v(S + i) − v(S) ≥ v(T + i) − v(T)
The convexity of v reﬂects a kind of complementarity among products:
the amount a buyer is willing to pay for an additional good increases with
the number of products he/she is consuming. Alternatively, the concavity of
v implies that the amount a buyer is willing to pay for a good decreases with
the number of products he/she is consuming3.
Lemma 8 If v is a monotonic value function then there exists an NE-
outcome of the form (N,p).F u r t h e r m o r e , i f v is strictly monotonic then
N is the unique SPE-consumption set.
Proof: It suﬃces to show that N ∈ sol(LP), but this trivially holds
given that if v is monotonic then v(N) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N. Hence,
N ∈ argmaxS⊆N v(S)a n db yL e m m a4 ,N is an SPE-consumption set.
If the value function is strictly monotonic, then N is the only element in
argmaxS⊆N v(S). 
5.1 Concave value functions
Concavity of v reﬂects a kind of substitution among products so that market
competition will permit the buyer to retain some surplus. Let us deﬁne,
Deﬁnition 5 Let v be monotonic, the marginal contribution of any product
i ∈ N is deﬁned as
c
∗(i)=v(N) − v(N\i)
3Notice that v is convex if and only if
v(S ∪ T)+v(S ∩ T) ≥ v(S)+v(T)
for any two subsets S and T of N, i.e., if v is supermodular. Similarly, v is concave if and
only if v is submodular.
24and the marginal contribution of any subset of products S ⊆ N is
c
∗(S)=v(N) − v(N\S)





∗(i) − v(S), for all S ⊆ N
Notice that by C1, if (N,  p)i sa nN E - o u t c o m et h e nv(N) −
 
k∈N   pk ≥
v(N\i)−
 
k∈N\i   pk, for any i ∈ N.T h u sc∗(i)=v(N)−n(N\i) ≥   pi. Hence,
if g(N) ≤ 0 (or equivalently v(N) ≥
 
i∈N c∗(i)) and every ﬁrm sets its price
equal to its marginal contribution, then the buyer surplus is still positive.
Following Shapley (1962), we say that ”products are substitutes” if for






∗(i)( P S )
The ’product substitution’ property, PS, implies that the marginal con-
tribution of a consumption set S is bigger than the sum of those of the
products in S, and we will see that this is implied by the concavity of v (see
Lemma 10). This property has been previously used in diﬀerent settings by
several authors such as KC (1982) and BO (2001), among others. The former
have employed it to justify that workers are better oﬀ by forming a union
rather than by bargaining individually with management, whereas the latter
to show that when buyers are substitutes, then the core has the lattice prop-
erty with respect to the buyers. In our economy, when property PS holds,
the SPE-price vector consists of the marginal contributions of the products
in the consumption set.
Proposition 6 If the value function is monotonic and PS holds, then (  S,  p) ∈
SPE-outcome set if and only if
(i)   S ∈ sol(LP), with v(  S)=v(N)
(ii) The equilibrium price of each product i ∈ N is   pi = c∗(i), the marginal
contribution of product i.
Proof: See Appendix.
We next prove that the above result is satisﬁed when v is concave.
25Lemma 9 Let v be a concave value function and let c∗(i) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N.
Then v is monotonic.
Proof: Let i  = j, i,j ∈ N.B yc o n c a v i t y ,
v(N\j) − v(N\{i,j}) ≥ v(N) − v(N\i) ≥ 0
thus v(N\j) ≥ v(N\{i,j}). In general, it can be proven by induction that
v(N\{i1,...,il}) ≥ v(N\{i1,...,il,i l+1}),
i.e., v(S) ≤ v(S + i).
Let S ⊆ T ⊆ N and T\S = {i1,...,il}.W eh a v et h a tv(S) ≤ v(S∪{i1}) ≤
... ≤ v(S ∪ {i1,...,il−1}) ≤ v(T)4. 








Proof: Let S = {i1,...,il}.T h e n ,
c
∗(S)=v(N) − v(N\S)













Now, by Lemmas 9-10 and Proposition 6, the following corollary is ob-
tained.
Corollary 4 If the value function is concave and c∗(i) ≥ 0 for all i,t h e n
the result of Proposition 6 applies.
4A monotonic function need not be either concave or convex. For instance, the value
function, v(1) = 1,v(2) = 2 and v(1,2) = x, is monotonic if x ≥ 2, but it is convex for
x =3 .5 while concave for x =2 .5.
26Remark: By the previous corollary, when v is lineal, i.e. v(S)=
 
S v(i)
for all S ⊆ N,t h e n(  S,  p) ∈ SPE-outcome set if and only if v(  S)=v(N)a n d
  pi = v(i) for all i ∈ N.I fv(.) is linear then it is concave and monotonic. Thus
any eﬃcient consumption set is such that v(  S)=v(N)a n dﬁrm i’s price is its






Recall that by Proposition 5 the SPE-price vector set is a subset of
T-core(G). Hence, for monotonic value function satisfying product substitu-
tion T-core(G)=core(G) and the core has the lattice property (Shapley and
Shubik, 1972). Let pb and pbdenote the highest and lowest buyer surplus,
respectively, and similarly deﬁne pk and p
k for each ﬁrm k ∈ N.T h e l a t -
tice property of core(G) states that vectors (pb,(p
k)k∈N)a n d( pb,(pk)k∈N)
are themselves in core(G). Moreover, no two vectors in core(G) are further
apart than these two.
In our case ﬁrm k’s marginal contribution is an upper bound of pk and
c∗(0) = v(N) −
 
i∈S c∗(i) is a lower bound of the buyer’s surplus, i.e., pk ≤
c∗(k)a n dpb ≥ c∗(0), at any point in core(G). Then pk = c∗(k), p
k =0 ,
pb = c∗(0) and pb = v(N), and by the above corollary, the most preferred
point by all ﬁrms and the least preferred by the buyer in core(G), i.e. C
∗
=
(c∗(1),...,c ∗(n)) is implemented as the unique SPE-price vector.
The next result relates SPE-outcomes with WE-outcomes. When v is
monotonic and concave (or satisﬁes product substitution), the lattice prop-
erty of core(G) translates to the WE-price set. Thus, the maximal WE-price
vector is implemented as the unique SPE-price vector. Let us summarize
the above discussion.
Corollary 5 If v is monotonic and concave (or PS holds), then the most
preferred point by all ﬁrms in core(G) is priced as the unique SPE-price
vector of the economy G. Moreover, this SPE-price vector coincides with
the maximal WE-price vector.
Example 2 (continuation): Function v satisﬁes condition PS. The unique
subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium outcome is (S,p)=( {1,2},(0.5,0.5,0)),
while the WE-outcome is, sol(LP)={1,2} and sol(DLP)={(1.5 − α −
β,α,β,0)|0 ≤ α ≤ 0.5,0 ≤ β ≤ 0.5}. The maximal WE-price vector coin-
cides with the unique SPE-price vector.
275.2 k-convex value functions
In this section we characterize the set of SPE-price vectors for a wide family
of value functions: k-convex value functions (see Driessen, 1986, 1988 and
Driessen and Rafels, 1999). For these functions the set of SPE-price vectors
is the convex hull of n! price vectors which are the corner solutions of RDLP.
We oﬀer the explicit value of these corner solutions.
It is not diﬃcult to show that if v is monotonic and k-convex, with k ≥ 1,
then core(v) is non-empty and it is a subset of core(G). In fact, core(v)i s
the set of solutions of RDLP. On the other hand, when v is monotonic and
the buyer surplus is zero, the SPE-price vector set is also the set of solutions
of RDLP, thus coinciding with core(v). Furthermore, if v is either convex
or symmetric k-convex, the Shapley value of v is an SPE-price vector; while
if v is 1-convex, the nucleolus of v is what is an equilibrium price vector.
Consider ﬁrst that v is convex, i.e., k = n. Then, the gap function g(N)i s
nonnegative (or equivalently v(N) ≤
 
i∈N c∗(i)) and ﬁrms cannot set prices
equal to their marginal contributions. However, as next Proposition states,
ﬁrms extract all the buyer surplus (πb = 0) and the set of solutions of RDLP
coincides with the set of SPE-price vectors.
Proposition 7 If the value function is convex then (  S,  π) ∈ SPE-outcome
set if and only if   S ∈ sol(LP) and (0,  π
  S) ∈ sol(RDLP).
Proof: See Appendix.
The convexity of function v reﬂects complementarities among products
and therefore it induces only weak market competition so that ﬁrms can
extract the entire buyer surplus. Moreover, if v is nonnegative and convex it
is straightforward to prove that v is monotonic as the next Lemma shows.
Lemma 11 Let v be a convex value function with v(i) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N.
Then v is monotonic.
Proof: By convexity of v and since v(i) ≥ 0f o ra l li ∈ N,given i,j,k ∈ N,
v(i,j) − v(i) ≥ v(j) − v(∅) ≥ 0= ⇒ v(i,j) ≥ v(i) ≥ 0
v(i,j,k) − v(i,j) ≥ v(k) − v(∅) ≥ 0= ⇒ v(i,j,k) ≥ v(i,j) ≥ 0
28Thus, v(i,j,k) ≥ v(i,j) ≥ v(i) ≥ 0. Extending this argument for any set
S = {i1,i 2,...,i s} ⊆ N it yields,
v(S) ≥ v(i1,...,is−1) ≥ ... ≥ v(i1,i 2) ≥ v(ii) ≥ 0
for any order of the elements of S. Hence, given T ⊆ S ⊆ N,i ti sv e r i ﬁed
that v(T) ≤ v(S). 
By Proposition 7, the set of subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium price vec-
tors are the solutions of RDLP and then they are a subset of Walrasian
equilibrium prices (see Proposition 5). Furthermore, the solutions of RDLP
can be expressed as the convex hull of at most the n! corner solutions. Again,
some deﬁnitions are needed.
Deﬁnition 6 Let Σ be the set of permutations (orderings) of N = {1,2,...,n}
and let σ ∈ Σ be any of its elements. Let Pσ
i be the set of ﬁrms which precede
ﬁrm i with respect to permutation σ, i.e., for all i ∈ N and σ ∈ Σ,
P
σ
i = {j ∈ N|σ(j) < σ(i)}
Deﬁnition 7 (Shapley, 1971) The marginal contribution vector xσ(v) ∈





i + i) − v(P
σ
i ),f o r a l l i ∈ N
If v is convex, then the marginal contribution vector xσ(v) is positive
and each ﬁrm is given its marginal contribution with respect to the economy
consisting of all its predecessors. Moreover xσ(v), for all σ ∈ Σ,a r et h e
corner solutions of RDLP. Then,
Proposition 8 Let v be a convex value function, such that v(i) ≥ 0 for all
i ∈ N. The following three sets are the same.
(i) Core(v)
(ii) SPE-price vector set
(iii) conv{xσ(v)|σ ∈ Σ}
Proof: (i)⇐⇒(ii) is given by propositions 4 and 7 jointly with the fact
that if the buyer surplus is zero, then the set of solutions of RDLP is the
same than that of core(v) ⊂Core(G).
29(i)⇐⇒(iii) is show in Driessen (1993). 
Moreover, when v is convex, the centre of gravity of all solutions xσ(v),
for all σ ∈ Σ is in Core(v) and coincides with the Shapley value of v.T h e
Shapley value can be interpreted as the expected marginal contribution of a
ﬁrm to the value of each subset of products, where the distribution of subsets
of products is such that any ordering of ﬁrms is equally likely.
Corollary 6 Let v be a convex value function, such that v(i) ≥ 0 for all
i ∈ N. The Shapley value of v, φ,i sa nSPE-price vector.
Proof: If v is convex, then the Shapley value vector, φ,i st h ea v e r a g eo f












|S|!(n − |S| − 1)!
n!
[v(S + i) − v(S)] ∀i =1 ,...,n.

Some of the above results for convex value functions can be extended to
the family of k-convex value functions. The notion of k-convexity can be
regarded as some kind of weak convexity. In fact, n-convexity agrees with
convexity. As shall be shown below, under k-convexity, ﬁrms still extract
all the consumer surplus, and an interpretation of k-convexity is as follows.
Suppose that the formation of the market with n ﬁrms (and hence n products)
is seen as a sequential process where ﬁrms enter one at a time until a market of
k−1 ﬁrms is formed and subsequently, the remaining ﬁrms enter altogether.
In view of this speciﬁc formation of the total market, k-convexity expresses
that the amount a buyer is willing to pay for an additional good increases with
the number of products (ﬁrms) she is consuming. So, the critical number k is
related to the size of the market and it is used to indicate that large markets,
consisting of at least k products (ﬁrms), yield lower proﬁts for ﬁrms (in
particular, their prices will be smaller than their marginal contributions),
whereas small markets, consisting of at most k − 1p r o d u c t s( ﬁrms) yield
higher proﬁts as compared with the value of the total market, v(N). Formally,
Deﬁnition 8 Let v be a value function and k ∈ N.W e s a y t h a t v is k-
convex if and only if v satisﬁes the following four conditions:
30• v(S + i) − v(S) ≤ v(T + i) − v(T) (D1)
(or in terms of the gap function: g(S + i) − g(S) ≥ g(T + i) − g(T))
for all i ∈ N and all S ⊂ T ⊆ N\i with |T| ≤ k − 2
• v(N) − v(T) ≥
 
N\(T+i) c∗(k)+m a x j∈T{v((T + i)\j) − v(T\j)},(D2)
(or equivalently given (D1): g(S + i) − g(S) ≥ g(N) − g(T)),
for all i ∈ N and all T ⊆ N\i with T  = ∅, |T| = k − 1
• c∗(N\S) ≤
 
N\S c∗(k), (or g(S) ≤ g(N)), (D3)
for all S ⊆ N with |S| = k − 1
• c∗(N\S) ≥
 
N\S c∗(k),( o rg(S) ≥ g(N)), (D4)
for all S ⊆ N with |S| ≥ k
We develop an interpretation of conditions (D1) to (D4). Condition
(D1) requires convexity with respect to market size up to k. Condition (D4)
states that for bundles T with at least k ﬁrms the total amount v(N)c a n
be distributed among all ﬁrms in such a way that bundle T receives at least
the buyer’s valuation for bundle T and ﬁrms outside T receive at least their
marginal contribution to the grand bundle N. For bundles T with k − 1
ﬁrms this way of distributing the total amount v(N) is not possible (by
condition (D3)) unless the marginal contribution to the grand bundle N of
an arbitrary ﬁrm outside T is replaced by its maximal marginal contribution
with respect to those bundles, which can be obtained from T by removing
one good (condition (D2)).
As in the convex case, if v is k-convex then it is monotonic with respect to
market size up to k−1, i.e., v(S) ≤ v(T)f o ra l lS ⊆ T ⊆ N with |T| ≤ k−1.
According to the above deﬁnition, v is 1-convex if and only if for all
S ⊆ N with S  = ∅,0≤ g(N) ≤ g(S), which coincides with property PS but
for the case S = ∅.M o r e o v e r ,i fk = 0, then the above deﬁnitions amount to
property PS.
Proposition 9 If the value function is monotonic and k-convex, then (  S,  π) ∈
SPE-outcome set if and only if   S ∈ sol(LP) and (0,  π
  S) ∈ sol(RDLP).
31Proof: See Appendix.
As above we characterize next the set of equilibrium price vectors as the
convex hull of at most n! corner solutions of RDLP.W h e nv is monotonic
and k-convex, then n−k ﬁrms set prices equal to their marginal contributions
and the other ﬁrms set prices below them. Thus, in the ”0-convex” case
(concavity) all the SPE-price vectors are the marginal contribution vector;
in the 1-convex case n − 1 ﬁrms set prices at their marginal contributions;
and so on.
Deﬁnition 9 Let v be a value function, σ ∈ Σ and k ∈ N. The marginal
contribution vector xσ,k(v) ∈ Rn of value function v with respect to number








i + i) − v(Pσ
i ) if σ(i) <k
c∗(i)+g(Pσ
i ) − g(N) if σ(i)=k
c∗(i) if σ(i) >k
Proposition 10 Let v be a monotonic, k-convex value function. The fol-
lowing three sets are the same.
(i) Core(v)
(ii) SPE-price vector set
(iii) conv{xσ,k(v)|σ ∈ Σ}
Proof: (i)⇐⇒(ii) is given by Propositions 4 and 9 jointly with the fact
that if the buyer surplus is zero, then the set of solutions of RDLP is
core(v) ⊂core(G).
(i)⇐⇒(iii) is show in Driessen (1993). 
A k-convex value function v,w i t hk ≤ n−1, is symmetric5 if v(S)=v(T)
for all S,T ⊂ N,w i t hk ≤ |S| = |T| ≤ n − 2. When the value function v
is k-convex but k<n , it cannot be guaranteed that the Shapley value is in
Core(v)u n l e s sv is symmetric for those bundles of size bigger than or equal







|N| ,f o ra l lS ⊆ N, denoted as property (CS).
5A single product Bertrand competition is a particular case where the value function
is symmetric but not k-convex. To see this, suppose that v(S)=1i fS  = ∅ and v(∅)=0 ,
i.e., all ﬁrms produce the same product.
32Corollary 7 Let v be a symmetric k-convex value function satisfying CS.
















and it is an SPE-price vector.
Proof: By Proposition 10, and Driessen (1993). 
In addition, suppose that a price vector b e l o n g i n gt ot h ec o r ei ss u g g e s t e d
to ﬁrms by a central planner and that some subsets of ﬁrms may complain
about their suggested prices. The nucleolus consists of all price vectors that
minimize the maximal complaints of all subsets of ﬁrms (if all complaints
could be arranged in the lexicographic order). The nucleolus is in the core of
v if it is not empty. In fact, for k-convex value functions the nucleolus exists
and it is unique although it does not have an easy general expression unless
k = 1. Thus, we show that, since v(N) ≤
 
N c∗(k)i nt h i sc a s e ,ﬁrms set
prices at their marginal contribution reduced by a constant: the gap of N
divided by n. This is the centre of gravity of the extreme points of core of v
and coincides with its nucleolus when k =1 .
Corollary 8 Let v be a monotonic, 1-convex value functions. Then ﬁrm i’s















and it is an SPE-price of ﬁrm i.
Proof: By Proposition 2, the set of SPE-price vectors is non-empty, thus,
by Proposition 10, it coincides with core(v). Also, it is well known that if
core(v) is non empty, then the nucleolus belongs to it. Thus, the nucleolus
is a SPE-price vector. 
Example 5: Let N = {1,2,3}, and let the value function v be,
S 1231 ,21 ,32 ,31 ,2,3
v 655 ααβ γ
33Case 1: v is 1-convex.
If α =3 0 ,β =2 0a n dγ = 42, then it can be proven that v is 1-convex.








{1,2,3} 18 12 12
{1,3,2} 18 12 12
{2,1,3} 2 281 2
{2,3,1} 2 281 2
{3,1,2} 22 12 8
{3,2,1} 22 12 8
All of them are SPE-price vectors and by Proposition 10, their convex





3 ). Notice that pb =0 .
Case 2: v is convex.
If α =3 0 ,β =2 0a n dγ =6 0 ,t h e nv is convex. Next table shows the





{1,2,3} 62 4 3 0
{1,3,2} 63 0 2 4
{2,1,3} 2 553 0
{2,3,1} 4 051 5
{3,1,2} 25 30 5
{3,2,1} 40 15 5
Again, all of them are SPE-price vectors and by Proposition 10 their
convex hull is the SPE-price vector set. The nucleolus coincides with the




Case 3: v is concave.
If α =6 ,β =5a n dγ =6 ,t h e nv is concave, thus, the unique SPE-
price vector is the marginal contributions, (1,0,0) and the buyer’s surplus is
pb =5 .
346 The nonzero cost case
Assume that the buyer’s value function v, can take on positive as well as
n e g a t i v ev a l u e s . W eh a v ea s s u m e du pt on o wt h a tﬁrm i’s (constant) cost
of production, ci, is zero. Let us consider a model in which these costs are
positive, c =( c1,...,cn) ∈ Rn
+. I nt h i sm o d e lw i t hc o s t s( S,p)i sa nSPE-
outcome if conditions C1, C2 of Proposition 1 are satisﬁed and condition C3
is modiﬁed as follows,











Let (v − c)(S)=v(S) −
 
k∈S ck. The associated linear programming
problem is the same as for the zero-cost case. It suﬃces to substitute the
objective value function v by {(v − c)}, both in the primal problem and on
the right-hand side constraints of the corresponding dual problem. As in
TUW(1997), all the results of the zero-cost case carry on to the non-zero-
cost case. The next Proposition relates equilibrium outcomes in the zero-cost
model to those in the nonzero cost model. We reproduce some of them for
completeness.
Proposition 11 (S,p) is an SPE-outcome of the zero-cost model with value
function v if and only if (S,p + c) is an SPE-outcome of the nonzero cost
model in which the value function is v + c.
This Proposition asserts that the SPE-outcomes for the zero-cost case
perfectly identify the equilibrium outcomes in the general model. If we are
interested in the equilibrium outcomes of a model where the value function
is v and the cost vector c,w em u s tﬁnd ﬁrst the equilibria of a model with
value function v − c and costs of production equal to zero. If (S,p)i sa n
equilibrium outcome for the latter model then (S,p + c) is an equilibrium
outcome for the former model.
Proof: It suﬃces to prove that (S,p)s a t i s ﬁes conditions C1, C2 and C3 of
Proposition 1 in the model with value function v and zero-costs if and only if
(S,p+c)s a t i s ﬁes conditions C1, C2 and C3’, respectively, in the model with
35value function v+c and costs c. We will prove only the equivalence between
C3 and C3’ given that the other conditions’ equivalence are similarly veriﬁed.



























(v + c)(S) −
 
k∈S
(pk − ck) ≥ (v + c)(T) −
 
k∈T\A





By Proposition 11 all the results for the zero-cost model can be generalized
to the cost model. We oﬀer an existence result,
Corollary 9 For every value function v and cost vector c there exists an
SPE-outcome. Furthermore,   S is an SPE-consumption set if and only if
  S ∈ argmaxS⊆N(v − c)(S).
Proof: Let (  S,  p)b ea nSPE-outcome for the zero-cost model where the
value function is v−c. Then, by Proposition 11 (  S,  p+c)i sa nSPE-outcome
for the model with value function v a n dp r o d u c t i o nc o s t sc.
Moreover, by Lemma 4 every SPE-consumption set of the zero-cost
model and value function v−c is such that maximizes (v−c)(S)o v e rS ⊆ N.
Hence, by Proposition 11 this is also the property of every equilibrium con-
sumption set of the general model. 
7 Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :
Step 1: If (  πb,  π) ∈ sol(µ-DLP)f o rs o m eµ ∈ Γ,t h e n  π ≥ 0a n d  πj =0 ,
for all j ∈ N\  S.T h u s ,  πb +
 
i∈N   πi =   πb +
 
i∈  S   πi = v(  S), which implies
that, v(  S)−
 
i∈  S   πi =   πb.B yt h ec o n s t r a i n t so fµ-DLP,   πb ≥ v(S)−
 
i∈S   πi,
for all S ⊆ N.T h u s ,
36v(  S) −
 
i∈  S
  πi =   π
b ≥ v(S) −
 
i∈S
  πi S ⊆ N
and C1 is satisﬁed.
Step 2: To prove that C2 is satisﬁed consider the following two cases:
Case 1:   πb =0 .G i v e nt h a tv(  S) −
 
i∈  S   πi =   πb =0 , then C2 holds for
Si = ∅ and for all i ∈   S.
Case 2:   πb > 0. Suppose there exists j ∈   S such that for all Sj ⊆ N\{j}
it is veriﬁed that,
  π
b = v(  S) −
 
i∈  S




We will see that this implies that there exists an   > 0 such that (  πb −





i∈Sl   πi
 
10d(L−l)and then there cannot exist any
j ∈   S as described above.
Let α =m a x S⊆N\{j}(v(S) −
 
i∈S   πi), take   =(   πb − α)/2. Let us see
that (  πb −  ,  π1,...,  πj−1,  πj +  ,   πj+1,...,  πn)v e r i ﬁes all the constraints of the
restricted dual problem.
Let S ⊆ N,i fj ∈ S,t h e n(   πb− )+
 
i∈S\{j}   πi+(  πj+ )=  πb+
 
i∈S   πi ≥
v(S). If j/ ∈ S given that v(S) −
 
i∈S   πi ≤ α =   πb −2  ≤   πb −  , then
(  πb −  )+
 
i∈S   πi ≥ v(S).
With respect to the last constraint,




  πi =(   π
b −  )+
 
i∈  S\{j}
  πi +(  πj +  )
Hence, (  πb −  ,  π1,...,  πj−1,  πj +  ,  πj+1,...,  πn)v e r i ﬁes all the constraints
of µ-DLP. Moreover, suppose that µ = {S1,...,SL} and that j ∈ Sl . Then,





















= F(µ,(  π1,...,  πj−1,  πj,  πj+1,...,  πN))
37which contradict that (  πb,  π) ∈ sol(µ-DLP).
Step 3: To see C3, let A ⊆ N\  S and let T ⊇ A.G i v e n t h a t   πi =0i f
i ∈ A (Lemma 3), then
v(  S) −
 
i∈  S
  πi ≥ v(T) −
 
i∈T
  πi = v(T) −
 
i∈T∩A









P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :The proof consists of several steps.
Step 1: Given that (0,  π) is a solution of DLP then   π ≥ 0a n d∀j ∈ N\  S,
and by Lemma 3,   πj =0 . T h u s ,
 
i∈N   πi =
 
i∈  S   πi = v(  S), which implies
that v(  S) −
 
i∈  S   πi = 0 and hence (0,  π) ∈ sol(RDLP).
N o w ,l e tu sc o n s i d e r(  S,π)w h e r eπi =   πi for all i ∈   S and πN\  S ∈ R
|N\  S|
+ .
We have to show that (   S,π) ∈ SPE-outcome set.
On the one hand, v(  S) −
 
i∈  S πi = v(  S) −
 
i∈  S   πi =0 . O nt h eo t h e r ,





  πi ≥ v(S)
where the ﬁrst inequality holds by the deﬁnition of πi and the second by the
constraints of RDLP. Thus,
v(  S) −
 
i∈  S
πi =0≥ v(S) −
 
i∈S
  πi ≥ v(S) −
 
i∈S
πi S ⊆ N
and C1 is veriﬁed.
Step 2: Given that v(  S) −
 
i∈  S πi =0 , C2 is veriﬁed for Si = ∅, for all
i ∈   S.
Step 3: Finally, to prove C3, let A ⊆ N\  S al e tT ⊇ A.G i v e nt h a t  πi =0
if i ∈ A (Lemma 3), then
v(  S) −
 
i∈  S
πi ≥ v(T) −
 
i∈T
  πi = v(T) −
 
i∈T∩A
  πi −
 
i∈T\A









To prove proposition 4 we need ﬁrst the following result:
Proposition 12 Let v be a value function. (  S,  p
  S) ∈ SPE-outcome set if
and only if
i)   S ∈ sol(LP),
ii) (  πb,  π
  S) ∈ sol(DLP),w h e r e  πb = v(  S) −
 
k∈  S   p
  S
k,a n d  π
  S =   p
  S.
iii) It does not exits any other (πb,π
  S) ∈ sol(DLP),s u c ht h a tπ
  S weakly
Pareto-dominates   π
  S.
Proof: Let (  S,  p
  S)b ei nt h es e to fSPE-outcomes. By Lemma 4,   S ∈
sol(LP). Also, it can be easily checked that SPE-price vectors satisfying
(C1)-(C3) verify all the constraints of the linear programming problem. Thus,
any SPE-price vector where non-active ﬁrms set prices equal to marginal
c o s t si sas o l u t i o no fDLP,a n dt h e n(   πb,  πS) ∈ sol(DLP)w h e r e  πb = v(  S)−  
  S   p
  S
k,a n d  π
  S =   p
  S.M o r e o v e r ,b yL e m m a6 ,  π
  S is non-Pareto dominated
by any other SPE-price vector.
Now, suppose that the three conditions in the Proposition are satisﬁed.
Step 1: By condition (ii) (  πb,  π
  S) ∈ sol(DLP), then   π
  S ≥ 0a n d  π
  S
j =0
for all j ∈ N\  S.T h u s ,  πb +
 
i∈N   π
  S
i =   πb +
 
i∈  S   π
  S
i = v(  S), which implies
that,   πb = v(  S) −
 
i∈  S   πi.
By the constraints of DLP,
  π





i ,f o ra l lS ⊆ N
Thus, for all S ⊆ N,











and C1 is veriﬁed.
Step 2: To prove that C2 is satisﬁed we consider two cases:
Case 1:   πb =0 .G i v e nt h a tv(  S) −
 
i∈  S   π
  S
i =   πb =0t h e nC 2h o l d sf o r
Si = ∅ and for all i ∈   S.
39Case 2:   πb > 0. Suppose there exists j ∈   S such that for all Sj ⊆ N\{j},
  π











is veriﬁed. We show that this implies that there exists an   > 0s u c h










n)i sas o l u t i o no ft h eDLP,w h i c h
contradicts assumption iii):
Let α =m a x S⊆N\{j}{v(S) −
 
i∈S   π
  S
i },t a k e  =(   πb − α)/2. Let us see










n)v e r i ﬁes all the constraints of the
restricted dual problem.
Let S ⊆ N,i fj ∈ S,t h e n
(  π





i +(  π
  S







If j/ ∈ S,g i v e nt h a tv(S) −
 
i∈S   π
  S
i ≤ α =   πb −2  ≤   πb −  , we have
(  π






Finally, the objective value function is,
(  π





i +(   π
  S






i = v(  S).










n) ∈ sol(DLP) which contra-
dicts assumption iii).
Step 3: Given that   π
  S
j =0f o ra l lj ∈ N\  S, then trivially C3 is satisﬁed.
Hence, (  S,  p
  S) ∈ SPE-outcome set, where   π
  S =   p
  S. 
Proof of Proposition 4: The set of optimal solutions of DLP is a
convex polyhedron, and so is the subset of not weakly Pareto-dominated price
vectors. A polyhedral set is completely characterized by its vertices Hence,
by the previous result it suﬃces to show that the set of non Pareto-dominated
vectors   π
  S, for which there exists   πb such that (  πb,  π
  S) ∈ sol(DLP), coincide
with the solutions of some µ-DLP.
40Let (  πb,  π
  S) ∈ sol(µ-DLP). Trivially (  πb,  π
  S) ∈ sol(DLP). Moreover, if
there exists a (πb,π
  S) ∈ sol(DLP)s u c ht h a tπ
  S weakly Pareto-dominates
  π


























= F(µ,  π
  S)
which contradicts that (  πb,  π
  S) ∈ sol(µ-DLP). Thus if (  πb,  π
  S) ∈ sol(µ-
DLP), then (  πb,  π
  S) ∈ sol(DLP) and it is not Pareto-dominated.
Now, let (  πb,  π
  S) ∈ sol(DLP), where   π
  S is not Pareto-dominated by the
price vector of any other solution and where (  πb,  π
  S) is a vertex solution
(i.e., it is not the convex combination of other solutions). Then, there exists
as e tS ⊆ N s u c ht h a tf o ra n yo t h e r( πb,π
  S) ∈ sol(DLP)i ti sv e r i ﬁed  






k.L e tµ ∈ Γ be an ordered partition such that S1 = S,
clearly (  πb,  π
  S) ∈ sol(µ-DLP).
Hence, the weakly non-Pareto dominated convex hull of all the solutions
of the µ-DLP problems is the same set than that of solutions of DLP for
which the price vector is weakly non-Pareto dominated. 
For the proof of Proposition 6 it is shown ﬁrst.
Lemma 12 If (N,p) ∈ SPE-outcome set, then
 
S pk ≤ c∗(S) for all S ⊆
N
Proof: By C1, v(N) −
 
k∈N pk ≥ v(N\S) −
 
k∈N\S pk, for all S ⊆ N,
thus,
c












In particular, the above Lemma implies that pk ≤ c∗(k)f o ra l lk ∈ N.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 :
Step 1: (N,p∗) ∈ SPE-outcome set, where p∗
i = c∗(i).
By monotonicity p∗
i ≥ 0. By the ’products substitution’ condition, v(N)−
v(S) ≥
 
i/ ∈S v(N) − v(N\i)=
 
i∈N\S p∗




k ≥ v(S) −
 
i∈S p∗
k. Thus, C1 holds.
C2 is trivially satisﬁed for Sj = N\j.
Step 2: If (N,p) ∈ SPE-outcome set, then pi = p∗
i.
By Lemma 12, pi ≤ c∗(i)=p∗
i. Suppose that there exists j such that





k∈N\S pk,f o r
all S ⊆ N\j.T h u s , v(N) −
 
k∈N pk >v (S) −
 
k∈S pk, for all S ⊆ N\j.
But then, ﬁrm j has an incentive to raise its price, which is a contradiction.
Hence pj = c∗(j).
Step 3: Let us prove that if (S,p) ∈ SPE-outcome set, then (N,pS) ∈
SPE-outcome set.














































for all T ⊆ N. Hence (N,pS)s a t i s ﬁes C1. To show that C2 also holds if
i ∈ N\S,l e tSi = S,b u ti fi ∈ S,t h e nl e tSi the one given by the fact that
(S,pS) ∈ SPE-outcome set.
Step 4: Now, we are ready to prove Proposition 6. If conditions (i) and (ii)
of the Proposition are veriﬁed then by Proposition 2, (  S,  π) ∈ SPE-outcome
set.
42L e tu sc o n s i d e rt h a t(   S,  π) ∈ SPE-outcome set. By Lemma 4,   S ∈
argmaxS⊆N v(S), hence   S ∈ sol(LP) and condition (i) is satisﬁed. Moreover,
by monotonicity of v, v(N) ≥ v(  S) which implies that v(N)=v(  S).
Let us show condition (ii): if (  S,  π) ∈ SPE-outcome set, then (N,  π
  S) ∈
SPE-outcome set (step 3). But then it must be the case that p∗ =   π
  S (step
2).
Let   πb = v(  S)−
 
i∈  S   πi,t h e n(   πb,  π
  S)i sas o l u t i o no fDLP: ﬁrst,   πb ≥ 0
given that (  S,  π) ∈ SPE-outcome set and by C1,   πb ≥ v(S) −
 
k∈S   π
  S
k
for all S ⊆ N. To show that (  πb,  π
  S)i sas o l u t i o no fRDLP consider any
(  πb,  π) ∈ sol(RDLP). Then (  S,  π) ∈ SPE-outcome set, thus by step 3
(N,  π
  S) ∈ SPE-outcome set and by step 2,   π
  S = p∗. In addition, given that
  πi =0 , for all i ∈ N\  S,w eh a v et h a t  π = p.T h u s ,
 





k∈N   π
  S
k. Hence (  πb,  π
  S)=(   πb,  π) ∈ sol(RDLP). 
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 :By Proposition 3, we know that if   S ∈ sol(LP)
and (0,  π
  S) ∈ sol(DLP), then (  S,  π) ∈ SPE-outcome set.
Let us prove that if (  S,  π) ∈ SPE-outcome set, then   S ∈ sol(LP)a n d
(0,  π
  S) ∈ sol(DLP). By Lemma 4,   S ∈ argmaxS⊆N v(S), which implies that
  S ∈ sol(LP).
We prove that (0,  π
  S) is a solution of DLP in several steps.
Step 1: First let us see that the set Sj in C2 is the null set. Let j ∈   S
and let Sj be a minimal set, with respect to inclusion, verifying that j/ ∈ Sj
and v(  S) −
 
  S   πk = v(Sj) −
 
Sj   πk.I fSj  = ∅,t h e nl e tk ∈ Sj.I fk ∈   S,
then let Sk be the set that veriﬁes C2 (thus k/ ∈ Sk)a n dﬁnally if k/ ∈   S,t h e n
let Sk =   S.T h u s ,
v(  S) −
 
i∈  S




≥ v(Sj)+v(Sk) − v(Sj ∩ Sk) −
 
i∈Sj
  πi −
 
i∈Sk




=2 ( v(  S) −
 
i∈  S
  πi) −







43where the ﬁrst inequality is given by the optimality of   S, the second by the
convexity of v and the last one by the properties of Sk and Sj.
Hence, v(Sj ∩Sk)−
 
i∈Sj∩Sk   πi ≥ v(  S)−
 
i∈  S   πi, and by optimality of   S
the above inequality translates into strict equality. However, this contradicts
the minimality of Sj (Sj ∩ Sk  = Sj given that k ∈ Sj and k/ ∈ Sk;a n d
if Sj ∩ Sk = ∅,t h e nt h en u l ls e tv e r i ﬁes C2 which contradicts again the
minimality of Sj). Hence, Sj = ∅ and v(  S)=
 
i∈  S   πi =
 
i∈N   π
  S
i .
Step 2: Recall that if (  S,  π) ∈ SPE, then (  S,  π
  S) ∈ SPE-outcome set.
Now, let S ⊆ N,b yC 3f o rA ⊆ S\  S,



















i∈S   π
  S
i ≥ v(S). Thus, (0,  π
  S) is a solution of DLP.M o r e o v e r ,b y









i = v(  S)
hence (0,  π
  S) ∈ sol(RDLP) ⊆sol(DLP). 
Proof of Proposition 9: Let v be a monotonic k-convex value function.
By monotonicity, if   S ∈ sol(LP), then v(  S)=v(N). Now, by Proposition 3,
if   S ∈ sol(LP)a n d( 0 ,  π) ∈ sol(DLP), then (  S,  π) ∈ SPE-outcome set.
Let us prove that if (  S,  π) ∈ SPE-outcome set, then   S ∈ sol(LP)a n d
(0,  π) ∈ sol(DLP). By Lemma 4,   S ∈ argmaxS⊆N v(S) which implies that
  S ∈ sol(LP).




v(S)i f |S| <k
v(S)+g(S) − g(N)i f|S| ≥ k
Notice that vk(S) ≥ v(S), for all S ⊆ N. Trivially vk(S) ≥ v(S), for all
S ⊆ N with |S| <k .B y( D 1 ) ,g(S)−g(N) ≥ 0, for all S ⊆ N with |S| ≥ k.
Thus, vk(S)=v(S)+g(S) − g(N) ≥ v(S).
The above implies that vk is the k-cover of v, it is convex and the core
of the economy induced by v and vk are the same (Driessen 1986). However,
44t h ec o r eo ft h ee c o n o m yi n d u c e db yvk is, by Proposition 8, the SPE-price
vector set. Hence, let (0,  π) be a solution of RDLP under value function vk.
T h e n ,i ti sa l s oas o l u t i o no fRDLP under value function v.
Now, if (  S,  π) ∈ SPE-outcome set and v is monotonic, then (N,  π) ∈
SPE-outcome set. Thus, by Proposition 4, (  πb,  π) ∈ sol(DLP), where   πb =
v(N) −
 
N   πi.I f  πb > 0, then for all σ ∈ Σ,a n dxσ,k there exists a ﬁrm i0
such that x
σ,k
i0 = c∗(i)=v(N) − v(N\i) <   πi, which is a contradiction. 
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